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The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) produced guidance on the use of 
Deterministic Safety Analysis (DSA) for the design and licensing of Nuclear Power Plants 
(NPPs) in “DSA for NPP Specific Safety Guide, No. SSG-2”, which proposes four options for 
the application of DSA. Option 3 involves the use of Best Estimate codes and data together 
with an evaluation of the uncertainties, the so called BEPU methodology. Several BEPU 
approaches have been developed in scopes that are accepted by the regulator authorities 
nowadays. They normally adopt conservative assumptions on the availability of safety 
systems. Option 4 goes beyond by pursuing the incorporation of realistic assumption on the 
availability of safety systems into the DSA. This paper proposes an Extended BEPU 
(EBEPU) approach that integrates insights from probabilistic safety analysis into a typical 
BEPU approach. There is an aim at combining the use of well-established BEPU methods and 
realistic (“probabilistic”) assumptions on safety system availability. This paper presents the 
fundamentals of the EBEPU approach and the main results obtained for an example of 
application that focuses on an accident scenario corresponding to the initiating event “Loss of 
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LIST OF ACRONYMS 
 
AFWS  Auxiliary Feed Water System 
ATWS  Anticipated Transient Without Scram 
BE  Best Estimate 
BEPU  Best Estimate Plus Uncertainty methodology 
CD  Core Damage  
CHF  Critical Heat Flux  
DBA  Design Basis Accidents 
DBC  Design Basis Conditions 
DEC  Design Extension Conditions  
DNBR  Departure from Nucleate Boiling Rate 
DSA  Deterministic Safety Analysis 
EBEPU  Extended BEPU methodology 
FB  Feed and Bleed 
FOM  Figure Of Merit 
FOS  First Order Statistics 
IAEA  International Atomic Energy Agency 
IE  Initiating Event 
IHI  High Pressure Injection system – injection mode 
IHR  High Pressure Injection system – recirculation mode 
LOFW  Loss of Feed Water initiating event 
MCS  Minimal Cut Set  
MFW  Main Feed Water System 
MSIV  Main Steam Isolation Valve 
NPP  Nuclear Power Plant 
OS  Order Statistics 
PCT  Peak Cladding Temperature 
PDF  Probability Distribution Function 
PORV  Pressure Operated Relief Valve 
PRZ  Pressurizer 
PSA  Probabilistic Safety Analysis 
PWR  Pressurized Water Reactor 
RCS  Reactor Coolant System 
RPS  Reactor Protection System 
RV  Relief Valve 
SD  Steam-Dump valve 
SG  Steam Generator  
SSG  Specific Safety Guide  
STL  Standard Tolerance Level 
SSV  Secondary side Safety Valve  
SV  (Primary side) Safety Valve 
TCij  Train/Component j of Safety Function i 


















Nowadays, regulators are concerned with the revision of current design license basis for 
operation of Nuclear Power Plants (NPPs) accounting for not only design basis conditions 
(DBC), such as anticipated occupational occurrences and design basis accidents (DBA), but 
also design extension conditions (DEC), both DEC without and with fuel damage, in a context 
where innovative approaches of safety assessment of current NPP are welcome. 
 
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) guidance document “Safety Assessment for 
Facilities and Activities”, General Safety Requirements No. GSR Part 4 (Rev. 1) [1], within 
the Requirement 15: Deterministic and probabilistic approaches, in requirement #4.56, 
establishes that improvements in the overall approach to safety analysis have permitted a 
better integration of deterministic and probabilistic approaches. With increasing quality of 
models and data, it is possible to develop more realistic deterministic analysis and to make 
use of information from probabilistic analysis in selecting accident scenarios. Increasing 
emphasis is being placed on specifying how compliance with the deterministic safety criteria 
is to be demonstrated, for example, by specifying confidence intervals and specifying how 
safety margins are set. Some previous research aimed at developing methods for integrating 
deterministic and probabilistic safety assessment or even at developing an integrated safety 
assessment methodology [2-4]. 
 
In addition, the IAEA produced guidance on the use of deterministic safety analysis for the 
design and licensing of nuclear power plants (NPPs): ‘‘Deterministic Safety Analysis for 
Nuclear Power Plants Specific Safety Guide,’’ Specific Safety Guide No. SSG-2 [5], which is 
now under revision [6]. The SSG- 2 considers four options for the application of DSA. Option 
4, which is also called realistic deterministic safety analysis, is currently under research. An 
area of research in this context aims at developing methods for combining insights from 
probabilistic and deterministic safety analyses [7, 8]. The new methods, such as the one 
presented in [8], are intended to be used for safety assessment of some current NPP DBC, 
which includes anticipated occupational occurrences, also called DBC-2 (faults of moderate 
frequency), and DEC, both without and with significant fuel degradation, which are also 
called DEC-A and DEC-B accidents respectively. Option 4 is not intended for DBA within the 
design basis conditions, also divided into DBC-3 (infrequent faults) and DBC-4 (limiting 















However, Option 3 involves the use of Best-Estimate Codes and data together with an 
evaluation of the uncertainties, the so called BEPU (Best Estimate Plus Uncertainty) 
methodology. Several BEPU approaches have been developed [9-16], some of them in scopes 
that are accepted by the regulator authorities nowadays. BEPU approaches focuses on an 
enveloping sequence representing a conservative progression of a DBA departing from an 
initiating event. Thus, for such an enveloping accidental sequence, it is adopted a conservative 
assumption on the availability of safety systems. Departing from this situation, Martorell et al., 
2017 [17] proposed the adoption of more “realistic” assumptions, e.g. probabilistic 
assumptions, on safety systems availability. It presented a practical approach to identify 
relevant configurations of safety systems and to assess the associated occurrence probability 
of such configurations using PSA (Probabilistic Safety Analysis) results. 
 
This paper proposes an Extended BEPU (EBEPU) approach that integrates insights from 
probabilistic safety analysis, such as the ones presented in Ref. [17], into a typical BEPU 
approach. There is an aim at combining the use of well-established BEPU methods and 
probabilistic (“realistic”) assumptions on safety system availability. This novel EBEPU 
approach follows the principles of Option 4 of the above IAEA SSG-2 guide, which can be 
used for realistic deterministic safety analysis of current NPP designs [5, 6]. An example of 
application is provided to demonstrate how this approach performs. The case study focuses on 
an accident scenario corresponding to the initiating event “Loss Of Feed Water (LOFW)” for 
a typical three-loops Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR) NPP.  
 
 
2. EXTENDED BEPU APPROACH 
 
The novel EBEPU approach proposed in this paper merges a typical BEPU approach and 
PSA-based assumptions on the availability of safety systems, the later making use of the 
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Figure 1. Overview of the EBEPU approach 
 
The main difference between a typical BEPU and this EBEPU approach is the incorporation 
of step 9 to account for best estimate assumptions, i.e. PSA-based assumptions herein, on 
safety systems availability under the EBEPU approach. In addition, step 10 must be updated 
to account also for random sampling of safety systems configurations in addition to TH 
(Thermal Hydraulic) parameters. Moreover, the TH computer model must be developed in 
step 7 with appropriate level of detail at component/train in a coherent manner with step 6 in 
order to make it possible to address the particular configuration of the safety systems required 
for each TH simulation or computer run in step 10. BEPU approaches focuses only on an 
enveloping sequence representing a conservative progression of the accident scenario (step 1) 
departing from an initiating event. Thus, for such an enveloping accidental sequence, it is 















The EBEPU methodology consists of the following steps, most of which are common to 
standard BEPU methodology as said. First step corresponds to the selection of the accident 
scenario, e.g. an anticipated occupational occurrence DBC-2 or DEC accident.  
 
Second step is the selection of the safety criteria linked to the accident scenario under study 
and the FOMs (Figures of Merit) involved in the acceptance criteria. As for BEPU method, 
the EBEPU approach involves simulation of a particular accident scenario using a Best-
Estimate code, which must provide an estimation of the evolution of relevant safety variables 
and their corresponding FOMs involved in the acceptance criteria of the DSA analysis. These 
FOM are usually extreme values of safety variables during the transient linked to the accident, 
e.g. critical heat flux (CHF), peak cladding temperature (PCT), etc. They describe the degree 
of challenge to the physical barriers that confines radioactivity in a NPP. 
 
Next steps 3 and 4 include the identification and ranking of the relevant physical phenomena 
based on the safety criteria and the selection of the appropriate TH parameters affecting those 
phenomena, i.e. selection of TH parameters with significant impact on the plant response and 
this way with major influence on the simulation results, e.g. FOMs, of the accident scenario 
using the Best Estimate (BE) code. 
 
Step 5 and 6 consist of the identification of relevant safety-related systems involved in the 
accident scenario and selection of relevant components/trains of the redundant safety systems 
that are responsible for performing the intended safety function to mitigate accident 
consequences. 
 
Step 7 involves the development of the TH computer model of the accident scenario used for 
FOM simulation, e.g. input for TRACE Best Estimate code [18], with appropriate 
component/train detail and accounting for TH parameters coherently with steps 6 and 4.  
 
Step 8 consists of the association of pdf for each selected TH parameter. BEPU approaches for 
the analysis of a particular accident assume the uncertainty in the safety outputs, i.e. FOMs, 
derives from the uncertainties in the inputs to the calculations (initial and boundary 
conditions) and those arising from the computational model. Current BEPU approaches 
mainly rely on a probabilistic description of the uncertainty in the relevant input parameters 














Step 9 comprises the identification of relevant, i.e. most probable, system configurations 
based on the availability of safety components/trains and association of a probability of 
occurrence for each configuration. Martorell et al., 2017 [17] presents a practical approach to 
identify relevant configurations of safety systems and to assess the associated occurrence 
probability of such configurations using PSA results of a NPP. The most relevant 
configurations mean the most probable ones according to PSA-based probabilistic models and 
data, which incorporate best estimate assumptions on the availability of safety systems. 
 
Regulatory requirements impose acceptance criteria on above FOM, and the BEPU analysis 
must demonstrate compliance of FOM against acceptance criteria addressing the effect of 
uncertainties (step 12). Therefore, the development of a Base Case simulation using only 
mean values of TH parameters and components/trains configurations is not enough, although 
it is necessary for calibration purposes of the model and inputs to the Best Estimate code.  
 
Most of BEPU approaches accepted by the regulatory authorities to verify compliance of 
safety criteria are based on propagation of input uncertainties (steps 8 and 9) through the 
model implemented into the BE code (step 7) and make use of Wilks’–based methods to 
determine the number of calculations of the safety outputs, i.e. FOMs, needed to verify 
compliance of acceptance criteria (step 12) with “standard tolerance levels (STL)”, typically 
95/95 in accordance with current regulatory practice. Accordingly, the value of the FOM that 
is compared with the corresponding acceptance criterion is often an upper or lower tolerance 
limit with level 95/95 instead of the FOM pdf. For example, it is often used one side tolerance 
interval of FOM based on the use Order Statistics (OS) of first order, i.e. FOS, with 
STL=95/95, which requires a sample size of N=59 runs [19]. 
 
The main advantage of using first order statistics (FOS) based on Wilks’ formulae to derive 
the STL is that it provides always a conservative result with a few runs of the computer code. 
This way, the computational cost is kept practicable since the simulation of the evolution of 
the plant transient for each sample of inputs using complex TH (Thermal Hydraulic) models 
of NPP is very expensive in terms of computational cost. However, the use of higher order 
statistics, e.g. second and third order statistics, is also proposed, which involves both an 
increase of the sample size (N) and an increase in the confidence of the coverage of the 















Consequently, step 10 consist of, first, random sampling of the selected TH parameters and 
plant configurations. The TH parameters are sampled randomly form their pdf without taking 
account their possible interactions as they are considered as independent parameters. For 
configurations, importance sampling is adopted using a pre-generated table of configurations 
and their associated probability, which has been obtained according to the procedure proposed 
in Ref. [17] that considers dependency among equipment configurations in a similar way as it 
is done in probabilistic safety assessment. The dependency between TH performance and 
system configurations is also considered. For example, let consider a given configuration in 
which a particular equipment is available. Even so, the equipment may be considered to be 
unavailable due to TH conditions imposed by the transient once the TH paremters have been 
sampled. Sample size (N) will depend on the particular statistical method and the acceptance 
criterion adopted to verify compliance of safety criteria. Second, it involves performing N 
computer runs to simulate the accident scenario and to obtain the FOMs for each run. 
 
Next, step 11 consist of processing the results of the multiple computer runs (N) to estimate 
either the probability distribution of the FOMs, or rather some descriptor of this distribution, 
such as for example a percentile of the FOM, or a tolerance level of each FOM with STL 
using OS, e.g. the FOS. Last step 12 involves to verify compliance of acceptance criterion for 
each FOM, e.g. with STL . 
 
 
3. EXAMPLE OF APPLICATION 
 
An example of application is provided to demonstrate how the EBEPU approach performs. 
The case study focuses on an accident scenario corresponding to the initiating event “Loss Of 
Feed Water (LOFW)” for a typical three-loops Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR) NPP. 
 
3.1 Selection of the accident scenario 
 
The group LOFW includes those transients involving total loss of main feed water to steam 
generators (SG), which reduce water level of SG and consequently reduce their capacity to 
extract heat from the reactor coolant system (RCS). In particular, this group includes initiating 
events of category 16 and 24 in EPRI/NP-2230 [21].  
 














level 1 PSA available and the corresponding safety functions required following the 
occurrence of LOFW. It shows two alternative ways to remove heat from the RCS once the 
Reactor Protection System (RPS) is successful to shut down the NPP. One way involves the 
injection of water to SG by the Auxiliary Feed Water System (AFWS) and removal of heat 
through steam-dump valves (SD), relief valves (RV) or secondary side safety valves (SSV).  
 
Eventually, in case of RCS pressurization, there may be a need to reduce pressure by means of 
the pressure operated relief valves (PORV), or primary side safety valves (SV) if required of 
the pressurizer (PRZ). Second alternative involves removing heat from the RCS by means of 
“Feed and Bleed” function, i.e. extracting warm water opening PORV valves manually and 
injecting cold water using the high-pressure injection system (IHI). In addition, it is needed 
re-circulation of water from the RCS using the same system under recirculation operational 




Figure 2. Event Tree for the LOFW transient 
 
Fig. 2 shows several accidental sequences following the initiating event LOFW. For sake of 
simplicity in the application of the EBEPU methodology, sequence #1 is the only one 
considered in the remaining of this case study (step 1). Other sequences may be studied in a 
similar way. Normally sequences ending with CD (core damage) are of interest for PSA, 
while those ending with OK, T7, T8 are of interest for DSA. Sequence ending with ATWS 



















































































































































































































































































































tree. In this paper, sequence #1 is of interest for DSA under the EBEPU approach. 
3.2 Safety criteria, FOMs and safety limits 
 
The document “Acceptance criteria and related safety margins” developed by the Task Group 
on CSNI Safety Margins Action Plan (SMAP) of the OECD/NEA [22] provides not only 
safety criteria and corresponding FOMs, but also an entire methodology to classify them into 
Categories according to plant states and transient frequencies.  
 
The PSA available for this case study corresponds to a typical three-loop PWR NPP, which 






. Based on this 
frequency, the initiating event LOFW belongs to Category 2 [22]. It also proposes several 
FOMs to represent the safety variables, their corresponding safety limits and acceptance 
criteria for Category 2, which address the multiple barriers supporting the NPP defense-in-
depth principle in order to guarantee the public safety. Table 1 summarizes the FOMs, safety 
limits and acceptance criteria considered in this paper (step 2).  
 





Acceptance Limit and Criteria 
Category 2 
Fuel CHF DNB_MIN 1.17 for 0 % rods 
Fuel FUELT FUELT_MAX 2863 K 
Primary PRZP PRZP_MAX 100% design Pressure  (18.9 MPa) 
Containment CONTL CONTL_MAX 0.2 % of primary inventory 
 
The first barrier is the fuel and the safety variables proposed include the critical heat flux 
(CHF) in the rods [23], the fuel temperature at the centerline of the rod (FUELT), and the 
peak cladding temperature (PCT). Related to the CHF, in this work the Departure from 
Nucleate Boiling Rate (DNBR) is calculated, which is the ratio of the heat flux needed to 
cause departure from nucleate boiling to the actual local heat flux of a fuel rod. This DNBR 
cannot be lower than 1.17 at 0% of the rods for category 2. Our FOM related with the DNBR 
will be DNB_MIN that is the minimum of the DNBR at any location and at any time of the 
transient. The fuel temperature safety variable FUELT has a related FOM called herein 














transient, whose safety limit for category 2 is 2863 K. 
The next barrier is the primary system of the plant and the safety variable proposed is the 
pressurizer pressure (PRZP). The associated FOM is the maximum pressure reached in the 
pressurizer, called herein PRZP_MAX, and the safety limit for category 2 is 18.9 MPa. 
 
The last barrier considered is the containment and the safety variable proposed is the leakage 
at the containment (CONTL), where the corresponding FOM is the maximum containment 
leakage, called herein CONTL_MAX, with a safety limit of 0.2% for category 2. 
 
3.3 Identification of relevant phenomena and selection of appropriate TH parameters 
 
Steps 3 and 4 of the EBEPU approach are similar to their equivalents in the traditional BEPU 
approach for selecting the TH parameters that represent relevant physical phenomena 
associated to a LOFW [24-26]. In order to select the relevant TH parameters in this example 
of application, the guidance provided in PREMIUM work [27] has been followed. They are 
presented together with their nominal value and associated pdf in section 3.6. 
 
3.4 Identification of relevant safety systems and components/trains 
 
Steps 5 and 6 of the EBEPU approach consist of the identification of relevant safety systems 
that take part in the progression of the particular sequence belonging to the accident scenario 
LOFW under study. Normally, each safety system consists normally of a number of redundant 
trains or components. As one can observe in Fig. 2, the progression of the accident scenario 
through the only sequence considered in this paper, i.e. sequence #1, involves successful 
actuation of the safety functions FT1 to FT5 presented in Table 2. It provides information on 
the safety function name, its success criteria involving the trains/components (TC) of the 




















Success Criteria TCij 
FT1 RPS Two RPS channels K 
FT2 AFWS 1/3 AFW trains AFW1, AFW2, AFW3 
FT3 PRZ-opens 1/2 PORV or 1/3 SV open (o) PORV1o, PORV2o, SV1o, SV2o, SV3o 
FT4 PRZ-closes 2/2 PORV and 3/3 SV close (c) PORV1c, PORV2c, SV1c, SV2c, SV3c 
FT5 2SG-closes 3/3 MSIV or 8/8 SD close (c) SD1c, SD2c, SD3c, SD4c, SD5c, SD6c, SD7c, 
SD8c, MSIV1c, MSIV2c, MSIV3c 
FT6 IHI 1/3 IHI trains IHI1, IHI2, IHI3 
FT7 FB 1/2 PORVm & 1/3 FBIHI PORV1mo, PORV2mo, FBIHI1, FBIHI2, FBIHI3 
FT8 IHR 1/3 IHR trains IHR1, IHR2, IHR3 
 
3.5 TH model description 
 
A typical 3-loop PWR NPP has been modeled for TRACE code and ran with version V5.0 
Patch 4 using the SNAP suite to simulate the transient corresponding to sequence #1 (step 7). 
The model consists of two thermal hydraulic systems linked: primary and secondary systems, 
as shown in Figures 3 and 4 respectively. 
 
The primary system includes a tridimensional component type VESSEL, which represents the 
reactor pressure vessel including the core, three independent reactor coolant loops, three 
primary side steam generators (3 SG), one pressurizer (PRZ) and three reactor coolant pumps. 
Reactor core consists of fuel elements of 15x15 rods divided into two groups. One group 
models the average power and another group, which is the most unfavorable fuel element, 
models the peak power of the hot channel. Average power elements are associated to the 
coolant cells of the VESSEL element (in radial sector 1, axial levels 3 to 8), while hot channel 
is modeled apart through a one-dimensional PIPE component connected to the entrance and 
exit of the core. 
 
In addition, safety systems supporting the primary system have been modeled: three trains 
corresponding to the high pressure injection and recirculation system (3 IHI and 3 IHR 
respectively) connected to the RCS (reactor coolant system), and 2 PORV and 3 SV connected 
to the PRZ.  
 














with the corresponding cooling loops in the primary system, and three FILLS representing the 
main feed water system (3 MFW). It also includes turbine group and steam dump valves (8 
SD valves).  
 
In addition, safety systems supporting the secondary system have been modeled: three 
redundant auxiliary feed water trains (3 AFW), three main steam isolation valves (3 MSIV), 
















































3.6 TH parameters. Initial and boundary conditions. Uncertainties 
 
Simulation of sequence #1 using the TH model requires realistic input and uncertainty, if 
applicable, associated with TH parameters (step 8). Table 3 shows initial and boundary 
conditions for primary and secondary loops and, if considered, their corresponding 
uncertainty parameters adopted in this example of application [26, 27]. 
 
Table 3. Initial and boundary conditions for the primary and secondary systems 
Parameter Units Ref. Value Uncertainty 
Thermal Power MW 2686.0 INPOW 
Hot Channel Peak Power (-) +20% PEAKF 
Pressurizer Pressure MPa 15.6 - 
Hot Channel Temperature K 618.0 - 
Hot Leg Temperature K 604.8 - 
Cold Leg Temperature K 564.3 - 
Average Temperature K 584.54 - 
Pressurizer Temperature K 618.43 - 
Rod Outside Diameter mm 9.48 - 
Pressure Loss in the core kPa 250 - 
Mass Flow Rate in the primary kg/s 12700 - 
Pressurizer Level M 7.22 - 
Steam Generators Pressure MPa 6.86 - 
Steam Generators outlet Temperature K 557.60 - 
Steam Generators inlet Temperature K 499.00 - 
Steam Generators Pressure Loss kPa 20 - 
Steam Generators Level (NR) % 50.60 - 
Mass Flow Rate by Steam Generator kg/s 475.00 - 




 Fuel Thermal Conductivity Vs Temperature Table 
 
In addition, Table 4 shows relevant conditions for operation (e.g. set points) for the simulation 
of the transient corresponding to sequence #1 using the TH model and, if applicable, the 















Table 5 shows the description of the pdf adopted to represent uncertainty of the parameters 
considered in this case study. 
 
Table 4. Relevant conditions for operation  
Parameter Units Ref. Value Uncertainty 
Level set point in SGs for SCRAM signal % 17.6 SCRSG 
Delay to reactor SCRAM S 0 SCRTO 
Residual power multiplier MW Table 
2
 RPOWM 
Delay to start AFWS pumps s 0 AAATO 
AFWS flow temperature K 293.15 AAATI 
AFWS flow rate kg/s 24.28 AAAQI 
Delay to open Steam Dump valves s 0 - 
Pressure set point secondary RV valves MPa 7.7 - 
Pressure set point secondary SSV valves MPa 8.1 - 
Pressure set point primary PORV valves MPa 16.03 PRPRV 
Pressure set point primary SV valves MPa 17.13 PRPSV 
Delay to close PORV and SV valves s 0 VCLTO 
2
 Residual Power Vs Time Table 
 
Table 5. Description of uncertainty parameters 
Parameter Parameter type Distribution type Min Max Mean Std. 
Dev. 
INPOW Multiplicative Normal 0.98 1.02 1 0.01 
UO2TC Multiplicative Normal 0.9 1.1 1 0.05 
PEAKF Multiplicative Normal 0.95 1.05 1 0.025 
SCRSG Multiplicative Uniform 0.95 1.05 NA NA 
SCRTO Additive Uniform 0 27 NA NA 
RPOWM Multiplicative Normal 0.92 1.08 1 0.04 
AAATO Additive Uniform 0 197 NA NA 
AAATI Additive Uniform -2 2 NA NA 
AAAQI Multiplicative Normal 0.95 1.05 1 0.025 
PRPRV Additive Uniform -0.2 0.2 NA NA 
PRPSV Additive Uniform -0.2 0.2 NA NA 














3.7 Identification of relevant configurations of safety systems and their probabilities 
 
In developing the EBEPU approach, simulation of sequence #1 using the TH model requires 
not only realistic input and uncertainty associated with TH parameters (initial and boundary 
condition and other TH parameters), but also realistic input on available safety systems 
configuration (step 9). 
 
As introduced in section 3.4 (see also Fig. 2), progression of the accident scenario considered 
in this paper, i.e. sequence #1, involves successful actuation of several safety functions, which 
must be performed by at least one of several redundant trains/components that take part of 
each safety system responsible for developing the corresponding safety function (see Table 2). 
 
Martorell et al., 2017 [17] presents a practical approach to identify relevant configurations of 
safety systems and to assess the associated occurrence probability of such configurations 
using PSA results of a NPP. The most relevant configurations mean the most probable ones 
according to PSA-based probabilistic models and data, which incorporate best estimate 
assumptions on the availability of safety systems. The PSA available for developing this case 
study includes the above event tree (Fig. 2) and the fault trees required to represent the 
unavailability (or availability) of the safety system trains/components that take part of the 
safety functions involved in this event tree (see headers in the above event tree). The results 
obtained using the above approach are summarized in the following. 
 
Let us consider the following vector g representing a generic group of equivalent 
configurations of availability/unavailability of the relevant Trains/Components. One 
realization of vector g will represent a particular group. The above vector contains 12 
variables, TCij, where each one can take a value ranging in the interval given in the 
corresponding TCij in Table 2 {0-1, 0-3, 0-2, 0-3, 0-2, 0-3, 0-8, 0-3, 0-3, 0-3, 0-2, 0-3}. 
 
g = {K, AFWS, PORVo, SVo, PORVc, SVc, SDc, MSIVc, IHI, FBIHI, PORVmo, IHR} 
 
Table 6 shows only the 16 most relevant groups of equivalent configurations, i.e. the most 
probable, out of the 507 groups found of about 8 million groups of possible configurations 
based on enumeration of combinations of the 12 variables in vector g. The most relevant 














to the accident scenario #1 under study. In Table 6, every configuration is represented by a set 
of numbers ranging each one between 0 and MAX, where MAX represents the maximum 
number of train/component redundancies according to Table 2. 
 

























































P(gm) Cumulative  
probability 
1 3 2 3 2 3 8 3 3 2 3 3 1 7,831E-01 7,831E-01 
1 2 2 3 2 3 8 3 3 2 3 3 1 1,110E-01 8,941E-01 
1 3 2 3 2 3 7 3 3 2 3 3 1 2,004E-02 9,142E-01 
1 3 2 3 2 3 8 3 3 0 0 3 1 1,743E-02 9,316E-01 
1 3 2 2 2 3 8 3 3 2 3 3 1 1,463E-02 9,462E-01 
1 3 2 3 2 3 8 3 3 2 3 0 1 1,021E-02 9,564E-01 
1 3 1 3 2 3 8 3 3 2 3 3 1 6,760E-03 9,632E-01 
1 1 2 3 2 3 8 3 3 2 3 3 1 5,319E-03 9,685E-01 
1 3 1 3 2 3 8 3 3 1 3 3 1 4,521E-03 9,730E-01 
1 3 2 3 2 3 8 0 3 2 3 3 1 3,828E-03 9,769E-01 
1 2 2 3 2 3 7 3 3 2 3 3 1 2,798E-03 9,797E-01 
1 2 2 3 2 3 8 3 3 0 0 3 1 2,475E-03 9,821E-01 
1 3 2 3 2 3 0 3 3 2 3 3 1 2,445E-03 9,846E-01 
1 3 2 3 2 3 8 2 3 2 3 3 1 2,349E-03 9,869E-01 
1 2 2 2 2 3 8 3 3 2 3 3 1 2,083E-03 9,890E-01 
1 2 2 3 2 3 8 3 3 2 3 0 1 1,472E-03 9,905E-01 
 
For sake of comparison between EBEPU and BEPU approaches, note that under the 
traditional BEPU approach, only the most conservative configuration belonging to accidental 
sequence #1 would have been considered instead of the array of configurations shown in 
Table 6. This conservative configuration would be the worst one leading to accident sequence 
#1 consisting of: successful reactor scram (K), one of three AFW trains is available and just 
one valve of SGs secondary side opens, two PORVs are unavailable, one of three SV is 
available, which is the only one available to close, and all three MSIV close. Consequently, 
there is no need to operate IHI, IHR, PORVm nor FBIHI. This very conservative 
configuration is associated group gworst={1,1,0,1,-,1,-,3,-,-,-,-}, which has a very low 
occurrence probability of 6.3E-07, which has been obtained directly from the PSA available. 
This probability is almost four orders of magnitude lower than the probability of the realistic 














4. RESULTS  
 
This section summarizes the results of the application of the EBEPU approach proposed in 
Section 2 using the TRACE code and the models and data introduced in previous Section 3.  
 
It encompasses with steps 10 to 12 of the EBEPU methodology proposed in this paper. A 
sample size of N=59 is adopted to obtain the one sided STL 95/95 using Wilks’ method. First, 
sampling of system configurations and TH parameters is needed (step 10). Thus, a sample of 
59 system configurations taken from Table 6 is generated by importance sampling depending 
on the probability of each system configuration. In addition, a random sample of 59 sets of 
parameters taken from their pdfs in Table 5 adopting pure Monte Carlo method is generated, 
which permits to obtain a sample of 59 sets of TH parameters from Tables 3 and 4. Notice, 
some TH parameters remain constant at their reference value in Tables 3 and 4 for the 59 sets 
since they are not associated an uncertainty parameter. One realization of the above system 
configurations and one set of TH parameters is used to built one input to the TRACE code. 
This procedure is repeated to built N input files to TRACE. Next, 59 computer runs are 
performed to simulate accidental scenario #1 to obtain 59 evolutions of the safety variables 
and 59 values for each FOM. Next step consist of processing results of FOMs obtained after 
performing N simulations with the computer code (step 11). Herein, FOS (first order 
statistics) is adopted based on the application of the Wilks’ formulae to verify compliance of 
safety criteria (step 12). So that, the maximum value found after 59 simulations is adopted for 
each FOM to verify compliance with the safety limit. 
 
In addition, the results found with the EBEPU method are compared with equivalent results 
derived adopting the BEPU approach. 
 
4.1. Base case simulation 
 
Simulation of accidental scenario #1 starts with the coast down of the steam generators main 
feed water pumps at t=100s, diminishing the capability of the secondary system to remove 
primary heat. Consequently, the water level of the steam generators abruptly plunges 
activating the SCRAM signal. In addition, auxiliary feed water pumps start restoring the 
capability  the secondary system to remove primary heat after SCRAM. However, primary 














reach PORVs valves rated pressure that opens (alternatively, SVs must open in case of PORVs 
failure). Once pressure has decreased latter on during the transient, primary relief or safety 
valves close and the plant goes to OK state.  
 
4.2. Results under the EBEPU approach  
 
In simulating the accidental sequence #1, the EBEPU approach considers realistic 
configurations of the safety systems availability based on the results of sampling from Table 6. 
Therefore, each particular configuration assumes a priori some trains/components are 
available. However, this only means the train/component is free of hardware failures when it 
is sampled to be available (operable a priori), however, even so, the train/component may be 
operable or not (a posteriori) depending on the TH conditions arising during the transient 
simulation. These conditions affecting trains/components operability are also monitored to 
decide on the component operability at any given time during the transient simulation.  
 
Figures 5 to 7 show the evolution of the safety variables selected under the EBEPU approach. 
It is important to realize although there are four safety variables (and corresponding FOMs) in 
Table 1, only three FOMs are considered and their corresponding safety variables are 
represented in these figures. The reason is that there is no sense to represent the CHF because 
of the heat-transfer regime for fuel rods is liquid single phase heat-transfer at any time for all 

















Figure 5. Evolution of FUELT in sequence #1 for the EBEPU approach 
 
 

















Figure 7. Evolution of CONTL in sequence #1 for the EBEPU approach 
 
 
The application of the EBEPU approach to this example of application shows that looking at 
Figures 5 to 7 the evolution of the safety variables of interest and the corresponding FOMs 
remain far below their safety limits. Thus, the maximum values of FUELT_MAX, 
PRZP_MAX and CONTL_MAX are below the corresponding safety limits shown in Table 1. 
Based on it, one may conclude that accident sequence #1 fulfils all the acceptance limits with 
appropriate safety margin and, therefore, the safety criteria are met in this example of 
application.  
 
4.3. Comparison of results between the EBEPU and BEPU approaches  
 
This section presents the results found for the same example of application adapted to follow 
the BEPU approach. The main difference as compared to the EBEPU approach is the adoption 
now of a unique and conservative assumption of safety systems availability, which remains 
the same for the N computer runs, instead of obtaining a sample of 59 system configurations 
selected from Table 6 by importance sampling depending on the probability of each system 
configuration. This very conservative configuration, represented by gworst={1,1,0,1,-,1,-,3,-,-,-
,-} has a very low occurrence probability of 6.3E-07, which has been obtained directly from 















In addition, a sample of 59 sets of parameters taken from their pdfs in Table 5 is generated, 
which permits to obtain a sample of 59 sets of TH parameters from Tables 3 and 4. The above 
conservative assumption on systems availability and one set of TH parameters is used to built 
one input to the TRACE code. This procedure is repeated to built N input files to TRACE. 
Next, 59 computer runs are performed to simulate accidental scenario #1 to obtain 59 
evolutions of the safety variables and 59 values for each FOM. Next step consist of 
processing results of FOMs obtained after performing N simulations with the computer code 
(step 11). Herein, FOS (first order statistics) is adopted based on the application of the Wilks’ 
formulae to verify compliance of safety criteria (step 12). So that, the maximum value found 
after 59 simulations is adopted for each FOM to verify compliance with the safety limit. 
 
Figure 8 shows again the evolution of the primary pressure PRZP obtained now under the 
BEPU approach. Only the evolution of this PRPZ has been plotted as there are no significant 
differences between adopting the EBEPU or BEPU approaches for the rest of safety variables 
and FOMs (Figures 5 and 7) in this particular example of application. 
 
 
Figure 8. Evolution of PRZP in sequence #1 for the BEPU approach 
 
Figure 8 shows the primary pressure remains below but close to the safety limit in many of 
the 59 simulations, i.e. PRZP_MAX is below and close its safety limit. Therefore, because of 
we are using a STL 95/95 and the FOS of PRZP_MAX to verify compliance of acceptance 














safety limit with STL 95/95. Therefore, accident sequence #1 would also fulfill the safety 
criteria in this example of application under the traditional BEPU approach but with a reduced 
safety margin for safety variable PRZP. 
 
Comparing Figure 6 (EBEPU approach) with corresponding Figure 8 (BEPU approach), one 
can realize the evolution of primary system pressure PRZP is quite different under both 
approaches as a consequence of the different assumptions on safety systems availability. In 
the former case, i.e. adopting realistic assumptions on the safety systems availability, the 
PRZP_MAX is low and PRZP goes to a very low pressure of the RCS in the steady-state 
reached in the long term of the accident progression. On the contrary, adopting conservative 
assumptions on safety systems availability, the PRZP_MAX is high and it may go very close 
to the safety limit, while the PRZP goes to a very high pressure of the RCS in the steady-state 
















5. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
The results of the example of application demonstrate that it is possible the extension of 
traditional BEPU approaches departing from the results available in the NPP Safety Analysis 
(deterministic and probabilistic analyses), which can be integrated in a natural way adopting 
the EBEPU procedure proposed in Section 2. 
 
In this example of application, the safety criteria are met under both EBEPU and BEPU 
approaches, despite of a FOM is very close to one safety limit in some simulation under the 
BEPU approach adopting a STL 95/95. However, there are important differences what 
concerns PRZP evolution. The EBEPU approach provides a more realistic situation while the 
BEPU approach presents a more conservative one, which may not be a realistic situation to be 
taken into account for transient evolution management. 
 
In addition, this situation may one think that for other less frequent and more hazardous 
accidental sequences the safety criteria could not be accomplished under the BEPU approach 
(more conservative) while safety criteria could be met under the EBEPU approach (more 
realistic and less conservative). Thus, adopting such unrealistic safety system configurations 
could make one conclude the design is inappropriate to manage such accident sequence when 
its occurrence probability is by far very low and unrealistic with such a conservative 
configuration of safety systems availability.  
 
Another important situation that one could envisage is that in spite of the most conservative 
assumptions on safety systems availability would yield most likely to the worst plant 
conditions, there is no evidence that this situation will be found always. So that, for planning 
and management of accident scenarios, e.g. emergency procedures development and operators 
training, one should identify and face those accident scenarios which are both realistic and 
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